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Abstract: As China's economy grows and matures, is it developing institutional patterns that 
resemble those of other wealthy countries? By examining the origins of modern capitalist 
institutions among wealthy countries, and how interests structured them, I draw implications for 
China. Specifically, I find that China resembles continental European capitalism far more than 
Anglo-American capitalism, and that it is likely to remain this way for the foreseeable future.
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21. Introduction
As China’s economy grows and matures, is it developing institutional patterns that resemble 
those of other wealthy countries? To answer this question, we must first identify the fundamental 
characteristics that differentiate capitalist economies from one another. In Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Hall and Soskice (2001), 
drawing on the work of Oliver Williamson (1975), point to asset specificity as a critical attribute. 
Where assets are specific to the goods and services that are produced, relationships tend to 
dominate the manner in which actors organize their economic activity. They call this kind of 
capitalist system a Coordinated Market Economy (CME). Countries falling into this category 
include many of the continental European nations, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Japan. Where assets are more general --
that is, they can more easily be switched from producing one kind of good or service to another -
- arms-length interactions predominate. This type of capitalist system is called a Liberal Market 
Economy (LME), and it is found in the UK, US, Ireland, Canada, and Australia. 
Within these two categories, several features of political economies complement one 
another, including education and training, innovation, employment, wages, fiscal and monetary 
policy, corporate governance, and the structure of the financial system. As one moves toward the 
CME end of the spectrum, education and training tends to be more specialized and geared 
towards the particular industries into which students will become employed, innovations tend to 
occur incrementally and primarily within well-established industries, employment and wages are 
more stable, fiscal policy is more redistributive (and income inequality and poverty levels are 
lower), monetary policy has more of an inflationary bias to promote higher employment, 
corporate governance tends to be more concentrated in the hands of a few owners, and the 
3financial system relies more heavily on banks. Where assets are specific to the goods and 
services that are produced, relationships tend to dominate the manner in which actors organize 
their economic activity, as in CMEs. Where assets are more general -- that is, they can more 
easily be switched from producing one kind of good or service to another -- arms-length 
interactions predominate, as in LMEs.
However, Hall and Soskice acknowledge that several countries do not fit neatly onto their 
CME-LME continuum. They place these political economies into a third category: 
Mediterranean (or Mixed) Capitalism. They are distinguished by their recent histories of 
extensive state intervention and large agrarian sectors, as in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Turkey (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21). Thus, taken together, Hall and Soskice identify 
three key attributes that distinguish capitalist systems from one another: asset specificity, the 
level of government intervention, and the importance of the agrarian sector.
Actors representing the key factors of production – land, labor, and capital – have a major 
stake in how institutions manifest these attributes. The coalitions that form among these actors, 
and who wins the political battles that ensue, is the determining factor for the structure of the 
capitalist system. And the outcomes of political battles that occur at critical junctures of 
institutional change matter most. Insofar as this perspective enables us to understand the origins 
of capitalist institutions among OECD countries, we can draw implications for China.
My analysis is related to work done by scholars who examine how interests and 
institutions affect financial outcomes. The argument, however, differs from those who consider 
coalitional conflicts among managers, owners, and labor (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005), the 
effects of decentralized politics (Verdier, 2003), those who emphasize social welfare politics
(Roe, 2003), or legal system effects (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) 
4and those who focus on the consequences of development in combination with international 
trade and capital flows (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
The paper is organized into the following sections: finance as a proxy for capitalism; 
actors and their preferences; coalitions and capitalist outcomes; historical patterns; cases: France 
and Japan; implications for China; and conclusions.
Finance as a Proxy for Capitalism
Because capitalist systems are complex, the analysis would be more tractable if it were possible 
to focus on a single sphere of the political economy that could serve as a useful indicator for the 
structure of the broader capitalist system. By what criteria should we choose this sphere? First, it 
would have to vary along the three key dimensions identified by Hall and Soskice: asset 
specificity, government intervention, and the size of the agrarian sector. Second, it should exhibit 
strong complementarities to other dimensions of the political economy. Third, it would be 
helpful if data were available across countries and time. These three qualifications make the 
financial system particularly attractive.
The first key dimension, asset specificity, gets reflected quite well in the structure of the 
financial system. With a greater reliance on general assets, and arm’s-length interactions, 
securities markets tend to be more important; LMEs tend to have a higher market capitalization 
than CMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 19). Government intervention in the economy also gets 
straightforwardly reflected in the structure of the financial system by the extent of government 
ownership of the nation’s banks. Indeed, development economists point to government 
ownership of banks as a, if not the, critical mechanism by which government intervention in the 
5economy takes place.1 The importance of the agrarian sector also gets reflected in the structure of 
the banking system, primarily through the scope of agricultural banking. A larger agrarian sector, 
and the size of financing directed to it, reflects its importance. 
3. Actors and Their Preferences
Because of their fundamental importance to the structure of any nation’s economy, their political 
power during industrialized nations’ institutional birth and evolution, and because they have 
strong interests in the structure of the financial system (and the broader capitalist system), actors 
representing land, labor, and capital are examined. What are the preferences of these actors with 
regard to the three capitalist attributes? 
Land (farmers): With regard to asset specificity, farmers prefer an economy with a greater 
emphasis on specific assets; in other words, a relationship-based economy. Long-term economic 
arrangements are important to them for coping with uncertain crop yields from one season to the 
next. Farmers, across most countries during the twentieth century, have usually been too small to 
seek financing from capital markets, and so they have tended to rely on local banks, either in the 
form of branches of large, networked banks, or in the form of unit banks (i.e., small, local banks 
without ties to a larger, national banking network). This relationship to the local bank, or 
agricultural credit bureau, is critical to their survival and success. Hence, they likewise have a 
clear preference for small, local, agrarian banks. They have also tended to favor government 
                                                
1 Gerschenkron (1962), Hawtrey (1926), Lewis (1950), Myrdal (1968), Garvy (1977), Kornai 
(1979), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Shleifer (1998), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2002).
6intervention in order to divert money away from industrializing sectors (where a higher return is 
likely). 
Labor (workers): For reasons of employment stability, an economy centered around specific 
assets would be more favorable to labor (Aoki, 1994). With regard to corporate finance, 
concentrated ownership encourages the long-term employment stability that labor seeks. 
Concentrated ownership may occur via banks, as in Germany and Japan for many decades 
following World War II, or through a majority of shares being held in the hands of a few owners. 
Unlike farmers, however, labor tends to favor a more centralized financial system which 
facilitates the financing of urban industries. But like farmers, labor also favors government 
intervention in the economy, primarily via banks, in order to provide financing to industry during 
downturns in the economy to avert layoffs. If banks are not a viable option for influencing 
industry (i.e., securities markets are more dominant as a result of globalization), labor still favors 
government intervention to minimize layoffs, as frequently occurs with mergers and acquisitions. 
In this regard, they favor ‘managed markets’. 
Capital (Owners): Owners of firms face two basic external financing choices: issuing securities 
or taking a loan. The recent literature on corporate finance focuses on a continuum of financing 
instruments defined according to the elasticity of their cost with respect to problems of 
asymmetric information (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; Diamond 1991). As firms 
mature, they ascend this ‘pecking order’ of finance. Firms just starting out may be forced to rely 
exclusively on retained earnings and the wealth of insiders. After a successful beginning, the 
firm can begin to rely on bank loans. The bank spends resources to monitor the firm, and protects 
7itself against adverse selection problems by holding a debt claim on the firm. As the firm 
matures and develops a track record, its financing will change. Informed intermediaries will be 
willing to take equity positions in the firm, which will reduce the leverage of the firm and its 
exposure to financial distress, and provide a positive signal to outside investors. Outside finance 
through securities may initially take the form of closely held senior instruments (e.g., private 
placements). Later, firms will graduate to issuing bonds and preferred and common stock on the 
open market to outsiders, using underwriters as a means for providing credible signals of the 
firm’s value to outsiders. 
At the same time, firms favor minimal government intervention since this reduces 
inefficiencies in the allocation of capital, and lowers the costs of obtaining financing (e.g., via 
taxes and regulations). Firms likewise favor low levels of agrarian financing so that capital gets 
allocated to industrializing (modernizing) sectors of the economy. But because the paper focuses 
on implications for China, it is important to emphasize that this preference regards privately 
owned firms. State-owned enterprises will tend to favor banks and government intervention since 
they would have to pay higher financing costs otherwise. 
4. Coalitions and Outcomes
Farmers (F), labor (L), and owners of large firms (KL) do not necessarily form coalitions in favor 
of specific financial system outcomes; rather, they form political power-sharing coalitions from 
which financial and capitalist structures emerge. Table 1 illustrates the coalitions and outcomes.
8Table 1: Coalitions and Financial/Capitalist System Outcomes
Cleavage Winner Financial System Outcome
Corresponding 
Capitalist 
System
Example
Rural vs. Urban
F
• High reliance on banking
• Increasing government intervention 
  with industrialization
• High level of agricultural financing 
Agrarian CME
Early 19th
Century U.S.
F vs. 
L & KL
L & KL
• Concentrated (likely universal) 
  banking and/or managed markets
• Moderate level of government 
  intervention
• Low level of agricultural financing
Classic CME
Germany  
post-WWII
Class Conflict
KL
• High reliance on equities markets
• Minimal government intervention
• Low level of agricultural financing 
Owner-oriented 
LME 
France pre-
WWII, Japan 
pre-WWII
KL vs. 
F & L
F & L
• Banking dominance via 
  concentrated banking for corporate 
  finance and decentralized agrarian 
  banking
• High level of government 
  intervention
• Moderate level of agricultural 
  financing
Mediterranean
France post-
WWII
Voice vs. Property
L
• High reliance on banking
• High level of government 
   intervention
• Low level of agricultural financing
Statist CME
Austria  post-
WWII
L vs. 
F & KL
F & KL
• Decentralized banking with well 
  developed, diffusely owned equities 
  markets
• Minimal government intervention in 
  corporate finance; gov. intervention 
  for agricultural financing
• Moderate level of agricultural 
  financing
Managerial LME
20th Century 
U.S.
Social 
Contract
F, L,  KL
• Concentrated banking for industry 
  with extensive local agricultural 
  credit offices and/or managed 
  markets
• Moderate government intervention
•Moderate level of agricultural 
  financing
Inclusive CME
Japan post-
WWII
91) Rural vs. Urban Politics
i) Farmers: Small, rural banks are likely to dominate when farmers wield political power. This is 
the first stage from which industrialization begins. As industrialization proceeds, the important 
question regards whether they will form a coalition with capital or labor. But of potentially 
greater importance is that democratic political institutions may be created when farmers wield 
vast political power, as in the early nineteenth century U.S. The political institutions allowed 
farmers to preserve their power despite a fall in their economic importance and population size. 
Accordingly, political authority regarding the structure of the financial system was turned over to 
the subnational level. Consequently, banking remained fragmented, and agrarian financing was 
disproportionately high.
ii) Labor and Capital Coalition: This coalition is the classic one that leads to a coordinated 
market economy in which a banking-oriented financial system emerges, like that found in post-
WWII Germany. In this case, concentrated ownership via banks permits greater employment 
stability for labor. At the same time, bank lending will generally be more centralized to cater to 
urban industries. Government intervention is also likely, albeit in a more indirect manner than 
that found when labor alone, or labor and farmers, exercise political control. 
2) Class Conflict
i) Capital: When owners of capital -- owners of large firms in particular -- control politics, they 
are likely to press for the development of equities markets and to retain controlling blocks in 
corporations (e.g., pre-WWII France and Japan). Government intervention will be minimal, and 
agrarian financing will be low. Banks will be universal with branches in rural areas to draw 
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deposits out of the interior and to facilitate climbing of the financial ‘pecking order’ (Calomiris, 
2000).
ii) Farmers and Labor: This populist coalition leads to a combination of centralized commercial 
banking to finance industrial development and local agricultural banking, with heavy 
government involvement in both. What is particularly interesting about this case is the difficult 
transition that occurs as capital owners become more influential. Because institutions were 
originally designed according to the preferences of labor and farmers, they do not easily 
accommodate capital owners’ growing influence. Consequently, growing pains occur for the 
political economy as its institutions adjust. Also notable of this capitalist outcome is the heavy 
government intervention in economy since both actors favor it.
3) Voice vs. Property
i) Labor: When labor wields exclusive political power, a centralized, government-controlled 
banking system emerges. Labor seeks to control the financial system through nationalized, 
government-run banks in order to direct lending to specific firms and industries in exchange for 
high and stable employment. 
ii) Farmers and Capital Coalition: When farmers exercise political power in democratic 
governments, they implement a decentralized banking structure, which may precede the advent 
of capital’s political power and economic importance. Once capital forms a coalition with 
farmers, capital requires the creation of centralized capital markets to finance industry since the 
banking system will likely remain decentralized. As part of farmers’ general antipathy towards 
oligarchic capital, they seek to prevent the emergence of concentrated banking and large 
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corporations, which creates political pressure for diffuse ownership.  The U.S. offers a clear 
example of the financial structure resulting from this power-sharing coalition (e.g., Roe, 1994).
4) Social Contract
This occurs when labor, capital, and farmers come to a three-way compromise on the structure of 
the financial system. This is more likely to occur when a foreign power imposes its will on these 
actors, and thereby forces a compromise among them. The clearest example of this is American 
influence on post-WWII Japan. If it were not for American involvement, a labor-farmer outcome 
would have been likely. However, this capitalist form may arise independently of American 
foreign pressure. For example, globalization places pressure on smaller states to form a social 
contract like that found among many small European countries (Katzenstein, 1984). As capital 
gains increasing leverage via globalization, a transition may occur from a mixture of banking and 
market reliance to a greater reliance on markets, though in a more managed form than LME 
countries.
5. Historical Patterns
Data across time and space for the financial system variables that proxy for the capitalist system 
are consistent with this framework. Hall and Soskice (2001) use stock market capitalization 
relative to GDP as their indicator for a nation’s reliance on markets relative to relationship-based 
forms of financing. This is a good measure, but it needs to be treated with caution. Stock markets 
are known for occasional bubbles which can last for several years and may occur across 
countries, making it a potentially unreliable measure if examining only one point in time. In the 
long-run (over decades), stock markets tend to settle around an equilibrium price level (e.g., 10% 
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increase per annum for the NYSE), making it preferable to measure a country’s reliance on stock 
markets across long periods of time to gauge a country’s overall reliance on markets. At the 
same time, looking exclusively at stock markets only captures one half of the asset specificity 
variable. It would be preferable to have a measure for a nation’s reliance on banks as well, such 
as bank deposits relative to GDP.
Table two shows the average reliance on stock markets during the pre-World War II 
period in comparison to the post-World War II era across countries. The ordering of countries in 
the postwar period, however, raises some questions with regard to the utility of the stock market 
capitalization measure as a reliable indicator for the LME-CME orientation of a country since 
some countries seem out of place, such as Switzerland (being too LME), and the USA (being too 
CME). 
Table 2. Stock Market Capitalization to GDP, 
Pre-WWII and Post-WWII
Source: Rajan and Zingales, 2003.
Table three illustrates the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank deposits. Compared to the 
stock market capitalization table, the country orderings seem more in line with the LME-CME 
expectations: the USA is appropriately LME for the post-war period; Switzerland remains on the 
LME side, but less so than before. Like table two, we see movement of countries along the LME-
High                                                                                                                               Low
(LME)                                                                                                                            (CME)
avg. 
1913-
1938
UK
1.2
JAP
1.17
BEL
1.15
CAN
.87
FRA
.76
AUT
.76
NET
.65
AUS
.6
SWI
.58
USA
.57
SWE
.39
GER
.32
DEN
.26
ITA
.22
NOR
.19
avg. 
1950-
1999
SWI
1.53
UK
1.15
CAN
1.14
AUS
.72
NET
.69
USA
.69
JAP
.59
SWE
.47
NOR
.36
FRA
.34
BEL
.34
DEN
.31
GER
.27
ITA
.25
AUT
.12
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CME continuum from the pre- to the post-WWII era, notably Japan, France, Switzerland, and 
Belgium. 
Table 3. Ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to Bank Deposits, 
Pre-WWII and Post-WWII
High                                                                                                                                   Low 
(LME)                                                                                                                               (CME)
avg. 
1913-
1938
CAN
4.8
JAP
4.23
UK
4.1
BEL
2.09
NET
1.98
FRA
1.78
USA
1.57
AUS
1.39
GER
0.95
ITA
0.89
AUT
0.68
SWI
0.62
SWE
0.56
DEN
0.49
NOR
0.27
avg. 
1950-
1999
UK
3.8
USA
3.31
CAN
2.87
SWI
2.46
AUS
1.63
NET
1.61
JAP
1.41
SWE
1.13
GER
0.99
NOR
0.86
FRA
0.83
DEN
0.72
BEL
0.7
ITA
0.66
AUT
0.24
   Source: Rajan and Zingales, 2003.
According to the argument, the structure of modern capitalism is the result of institutional 
bargains struck among actors representing an economy’s factors of production. For some 
countries, these bargains were struck at the beginning of the twentieth century. For others, 
political battles fought after World War II led to the restructuring of its institutions both the 
constitution and their capitalist institutions (e.g., France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan). 
Thus, it is important that we are sensitive to the period of time when actors fought their most 
recent and consequential political battles over nations’ capitalist institutions.
How do we measure actors’ power? It is notoriously difficult to accurately measure 
farmers’ political influence across nations, so I focus on labor’s political power for the 
quantitative tests (I assess farmers’ influence in the case studies). In this regard, I use a measure 
compiled by Franzese (2002) which takes the average ideological value assigned to political 
parties by multiple expert studies, and is then weighted according to the number of cabinet posts 
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held by each party.2 This variable allows us to place countries on a left-right wing political 
spectrum which then also accounts for the political orientation towards labor or capital (the 
higher the value, the more left-wing). Because the earliest measure is 1950, I extend it to the pre-
World War II period.3 Thus, I derive two partisanship measures: a pre-WWII one and a post-
                                                
2 The expert studies include Laver and Hunt (1992), Laver and Schofield (1990), Dodd (1976), 
Castles and Mair (1984), Laver and Budge (1992), Sani and Sartori (1983), Morgan (1976), 
Inglehardt and Klingemann (1987), Mavgordatos (1984), Bruneau and MacCleod (1986), Blair 
(1984), Kerr (1987), Taylor and Laver (1973), Browne and Dreijmanis (1982), and de Swaan 
(1973). Multiple expert studies are used to minimize the bias/subjectivity caused by relying on 
only one or a couple.
3 To extend Franzese’s measure prior to WWII, I use Dodd’s (1976) ideological placement of 
political parties during the interwar period. I normalize his score so that it corresponds to the 0 –
10 scale. Data on the partisan composition of government is obtained with Mackie and Rose’s 
(1990) and Flora’s (1987) data which, respectively, provide the proportion of seats in parliament 
held by each political party as well as the coalition parties forming a government, if a coalition 
occurred. Based on observation of such coalitions in the postwar period and coalitions in the 
interwar period where data are available (e.g., Australia), cabinet seats are generally assigned to 
parties according to the proportion of seats the coalition partner holds as a percentage of total 
coalition seats. Thus, based on the proportion of parliamentary seats each coalition party holds, 
we can determine the percentage of cabinet seats the party held, and then calculate the average 
partisan score for each government so that it corresponds to Franzese’s measure. These data are 
available across countries for 1929, which offers a useful indicator for countries’ partisanship 
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WWII one, which simply updates the prewar measure with data from 1950 for five countries  
(Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) to reflect the partisanship levels when new 
institutional bargains were struck. Table 4 shows OLS regression results while controlling for 
legal family: common or civil law (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). The 
relationship between partisanship and the alternative measures for countries’ market reliance is 
generally robust across time.
Table 4: Partisanship and Stock Market Reliance
DV: Pre-
WWII 
Market/Bank
DV: Pre-
WWII 
Market Cap 
DV: Post-WWII 
Market Cap/Bank 
Deposits
DV: Post-
WWII 
Market Cap
Pre-WWII 
Partisanship 
-0.69***
(-3.86)
-0.13**
(-2.76)
Post-WWII 
Partisanship
-0.22***
(-2.78)
-0.08*
(-1.8)
Common Law -0.1
(-0.16)
-0.11
(-0.64)
1.08***
(3.78)
0.32*
(1.98)
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.33 0.77 0.49
N 13 13 15 15
      *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level.
      Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
The second crucial aspect of capitalist systems – government intervention – is first tested 
with respect to government ownership of banks in 1970 and 1995 - before and after the 
privatization waves – and exhibits a statistically significant correlation to government 
partisanship. The alternative measure for government intervention – state control – likewise 
                                                                                                                                                            
levels; indeed, many of the key bargains over the structure of modern capitalist institutions were 
struck during this interwar period.
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exhibits a statistically significant correlation. This latter variable offers a broader measure for 
government intervention since it includes state ownership of nonfinancial enterprises, and so the 
higher adjusted R-squared is suggestive of the importance of the bargains struck between labor 
and capital to the overall structure of the economy.
Table 5: Partisanship at Origins of Capitalist Institutions 
(post-WWII) and Government Intervention
*** Correlation is significant at the 1% level; ** Correlation is significant 
at the 5% level.
Note: t-statistics shown in parentheses.
6. Cases
To draw implications for China, I briefly consider two country cases: pre- and post-WWII Japan 
and pre- and post-WWWII France. These cases are useful because they illustrate the 
consequences for the capitalist system when a crisis occurs that grants more power to labor and 
farmers - two of China’s largest groups that currently lack political representation, but which 
could dramatically alter China’s political economy if they were to gain political power.
A) Japan, Pre-WWII: Owner-Oriented LME
Japan’s pre-war financial system was highly dependent on equity finance, which began with a 
privatization wave in 1880. Not until wartime financing occurred (beginning in 1937 with the 
Gov Ownership 
Banks 1970
Gov Ownership 
Banks 1995
State Control
Partisanship at 
Origins of 
Capitalist 
Institutions 
(post-WWII)
0.08**
(2.13)
0.06**
(2.75)
0.38***
(3.24)
Adjusted R2 0.2 0.32 0.4
N 15 15 15
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Sino-Japanese war), did the financial system begin to change into a more concentrated, and bank 
dependent one (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). But with regard to the prewar banking system, most 
of the financing went to industry, rather than agriculture. Small farmers generally faced a capital 
shortage and had to pay high loan rates; around 9.2% in 1929, compared with large firms’ bond 
yields of 5.5-6%. Thus, Japan’s financial system in the pre-war era is characterized by a high 
reliance on securities markets, low levels of government intervention, and weak agricultural 
financing. 
Japan’s politics exhibited strong links between the rapidly growing business sector and 
government officials, with rural elites also wielding political influence. Political institutions 
entrenched power in the hands of the oligarchs who surrounded the emperor (the Genrō and the 
Privy Council) with some political power accorded to the upper house of the Diet (the House of 
Peers). These institutions kept policymaking out of the hands of popular influence (e.g., labor 
and small farmers), and thereby cemented the power of the elite – particularly the business elite 
and the wealthy bushido leaders. Consequently, they determined domestic economic policy, and 
ensured that owner-oriented markets dominated the structure of the financial system, with little 
government intervention. And, because such a small proportion of agrarian interests wielded any 
significant political influence, agricultural financing remained relatively low.
In the prewar period, labor had almost no influence on the financing decisions of large 
firms, nor on the financial system more broadly. Although labor gained some concessions during 
the interwar period, when it was strongest, the most significant pieces of legislation which would 
have legally protected labor unions, the Labor Union Bills of 1926 and 1927, were never passed 
by the Diet. 
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B) Japan, Post-WWII: Inclusive CME
When the war with China began in 1938, a series of laws were passed to put the allocation and 
control of finance firmly under government control, resembling similar actions performed by 
other countries during WWII (e.g., France, Germany, and Italy). To this end, banks were 
consolidated. The 424 ordinary banks at the end of 1936 were consolidated to just 61 in 1945 
with four major zaibatsu banks controlling almost half of the capital of Japan’s financial 
institutions.4  
By the end of the war, bank-firm relationships were solidified and assigned banks 
dominated firms’ external financing needs; capital raised on securities markets (bond markets in 
particular since the stock exchange had been closed) fell to a trickle. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) 
find that the relations formalized by the munitions companies system of WWII (where a bank is 
assigned to a particular firm) lasted well into the postwar period.
It is important to note that although banks dominated financing during the war, this did 
not mean that Japan’s postwar financial system would remain banking-oriented. In both the US 
and UK, banks were heavily relied upon during the war, and yet markets came to dominate 
shortly after the war ended. The political situation in Japan following the war was critical to 
allowing and even encouraging the continuance of the wartime bank-firm relations.
Labor: The labor movement surged immediately after the war, as shown in figure one. Nosaka 
Sanzo, a leading Communist, published “An Appeal to the Japanese People” which served as the 
basis for the Emancipation League (formerly the Anti-War League), founded in 1944. The 
League’s program was couched in moderate language so as to appeal to a wide audience, but 
                                                
4 See Adams, 1964, 128-59; and Hoshi and Kashyap, ch. 3.
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among its key policy prescriptions, it advocated “maintaining and strengthening state control 
over banks” (Colbert, 1952: 64). The program served as the ideological basis for a large segment 
of the postwar labor movement. The more moderate Socialists, in 1946, proposed a system of 
state control of key industries (Colbert, 1952: 88), as well as the establishment of a Supreme 
Economic Council to determine general economic policies, subsidiary councils for each industry, 
and at each level of planning or supervision trade-union representatives, as well as 
representatives of business and government would participate. The long-term financial program 
of the Socialist Party called for the socialization of all banks and insurance companies, entailing 
the establishment of a Banking Control Committee to be headed by the Finance Minister and to 
be responsible for the utilization of funds. Additionally, it proposed that half of each banks’ 
managers would be selected from among its employees (Colbert, 1952: 90). The resemblance to 
France’s postwar Socialist policies is striking (Kuisel, 1986).
At first, American General Headquarters (GHQ) actively promoted labor unions, but as 
the Cold War began and the communist threat increased, GHQ modified its policies. The 
implementation of the Dodge Plan led to firings and layoffs on a large scale, causing the 
elimination of a large sector of the militant left, and to the reorganization and strengthening of 
oligopoly capital. Although the Dodge program involved expanding big industry and therefore 
employment in big industry, the reorganization was used carefully to weed out militant workers 
and to weaken the union movement. To retain the loyalty of the remaining workers, managers 
offered remaining employees lifetime employment. At the same time, the Japanese main bank 
system developed strongly after World War II.5 The main banks’ ownership of stock in industrial 
                                                
5 Hoshi (1995) shows that post-war main bank relations grew directly out of the authoritative 
wartime allocation of defense companies to particular banks. 
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firms expanded, making them main bank stockholder-creditors. They monitored firms, and acted 
as firms’ main source of external financing for several decades after the war. Although this 
banking-oriented financial system remained out of the control of labor, it neatly matched their 
initiative for financing arrangements that would offer employment stability. Lifetime 
employment and the main bank system acted as stable complements, even if one did not induce 
the other.
Farmers: Following the war, several institutional mechanisms vaulted farmers to a politically 
powerful position, including the electoral system, universal male suffrage, the executive-
legislative balance, and malapportionment.
Candidate-centered electoral systems such as Japan’s multi-member district single 
nontransferable vote system create incentives for politicians to develop a loyal group of 
supporters (personal vote coalitions) by wooing them with pork in exchange for votes (Cowhey 
and McCubbins, 1995: 44). In Japan, farmers have benefited considerably as the key members of 
these local vote coalitions. 
But the influence of farmers and small firms became a political reality only because 
Japan’s postwar institutions granted significantly more power to the lower house than during the 
prewar era. Land redistribution vaulted farmers to a very politically powerful position following 
the war, and they subsequently comprised nearly half of the total electorate in 1950.
With such an overwhelming proportion of the electorate, agricultural interests had 
sufficient power to elect Diet members outright and to propose and pass legislation. Farmers 
ensured a favorable deposit rate for themselves via the postal savings banks, and as long as 
economic growth remained high, they could be sure that the banks could pay that interest rate. 
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This led to a high accumulation of funds for the government, which were used to finance 
industry via the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, and saved these firms from diluting their 
ownership via share sales on the equities market and via mergers and acquisitions. In this way, 
farmers contributed to Japanese firms’ reliance on patient capital. Of course, farmers also 
increased agricultural financing and bolstered government intervention in the economy. 
C) France, Pre-WWII: Owner-Oriented LME
Like pre-war Japan, France’s Third Republic political institutions also privileged the wealthy 
elite and excluded the populace from exercising real political influence. The financial system 
likewise exhibited a strong reliance on markets, with little government intervention, and low 
levels of agrarian financing. 
Prior to the 1930s, France relied heavily on capital markets as the conduit by which 
money flowed from savers to borrowers with self-financing becoming more common during the 
1930s.6 Table 6 shows the decline in stock and bond issues after WWII. 
                                                
6 Bank financing also experienced a change from a reliance on private banking in the 1920s to 
public banking in the 1930s (Gueslin, 1992: 85).
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Table 6: French Corporations’ Stock and Bond Issues, 1900-1964
(percent of gross domestic product)
Year Stocks Bonds Total
1900 2.0 1.8 3.8
1913 2.6 2.9 5.5
1924 3.3 1.2 4.5
1929 5.7 2.6 8.3
1930 3.4 4.4 7.8
1949 0.6 0.3 0.9
1954 0.6 0.8 1.4
1959 1.7 1.4 3.1
1962 1.4 1.2 2.6
1964 1.2 1.0 2.2
      Source: Carré, Dubois, and Malinvaud (1975, 334)
Additionally, there was little government intervention in the economy, and agrarian financing 
likewise remained very low but this changed considerably after the war.
France’s pre-WWII government was dominated by the parliament, comprised of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with the Senate having the clear upper hand. The Senate 
was designed to insulate the political system from the universal suffrage of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Senators were elected indirectly by mayors and councilors of departmental and 
arrondissement assemblies, ensuring that they were elected only by the privileged. Wealthy 
landowners were over-represented in the Senate, and big business also wielded considerable 
influence through their direct financial contributions to Senators and through the growing 
number of wealthy industrialists. Labor, small business and small farmers had almost no 
influence in the upper house. Rather, their votes were important to the election of Deputies.
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Interests:  From the mid-nineteenth century up to the 1930s, the national supply of credit went 
increasingly to firms participating in the industrial revolution (Gueslin, 1978, 29-44).7
Consequently, farmers faced rising borrowing costs. And in terms of France’s overall financial 
system, agricultural credit constituted a small fraction of total enterprise financing.
Prior to World War I, unions and left-wing political movements had sporadic, but mostly 
negligible influence on firms and government. At the end of World War I, labor activity and 
union membership surged. On December 16, 1918 the Confederation of Workers issued a 
statement of the changes it sought in its Minimum Program, which formed the major themes of 
the interwar years. With regard to the economy, this document primarily focuses on the objective 
of dirigisme (Lorwin, 1954: 52-53). 
After World War I, the Confederation of Business Owners was formed to represent the 
interests of big business to government, in reaction to the growing political influence of labor. 
Big business sought to ensure that the ‘classical laws’ of laissez-faire governed the structure of 
the French economy (Duchemin, 1940). This equated to ensuring that access to capital remained 
free from any government imposed restrictions or manipulation, such as regulations affecting 
access to securities markets, as well as control over lending arrangements through various credit 
granting facilities (i.e., banks). 
D) France, Post-WWII: Mediterranean Capitalism
Socialists and conservatives had different visions for postwar France. The Socialist Program 
proposed comprehensive planning (and Keynesian countercyclical policies) to sustain full 
                                                
7 Gueslin’s book, Les Origines du Crédit Agricole (1840-1914), offers a very thorough account 
of the formation of the Crédit Agricole.
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employment and economic development. Its author, André Philip, argued that in a planned 
economy certain producers were so important that they had to be nationalized so that the state 
could effectively control investment.8
The conservative neoliberal perspective was articulated best with Courtin’s Program, 
which envisaged a “return to the market, economic freedom, and free trade” that prevailed during 
the Third Republic (Kuisel, 1981: 171). Ultimately, labor in alliance with farmers, would win the 
political battle by a wide margin and France would bolster industrial and agrarian banks, and 
promote high levels of government intervention. 
Labor: In the immediate postwar environment, popular opinion accused big business of aiding 
the downfall of the French Republic. A popular election held in October 1945 confirmed the 
leftward swing that had taken place in the electorate. One of the first items on the agenda of the 
new Constituent Assembly was the nationalization of banks since credit was a critical element 
for reconstructing and managing the economy. The banking act that was eventually passed on 
December 2nd 1945 nationalized the four largest deposit banks (these held around half of all 
banks’ assets and were the only banks with nationwide branch networks) and extended minor 
regulations over private investment banks.9 All representatives from the left and center voted for 
                                                
8 André Philip’s report was published by the Parti Socialiste, Pour la Rénovation de la 
République, and entitled Les Reformes de Structure.
9 For information on the formulation and effect of this banking legislation, see Alhadeff’s six 
chapters on French banking in Competition and Controls in Banking (1968), Wilson’s French 
Banking Structure and Credit Policy (1957), the France chapter by Henry Germain-Martin in 
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it.10 The law structured French finance for the postwar period and gave the government greater 
influence over the course of postwar economic development by placing the volume and 
allocation of credit firmly under its control. 
Farmers: With the new provisional government, small farmers now enjoyed political influence 
more closely reflecting their proportion of the population; there was no longer a Senate to block 
their legislative initiatives. So, between 1950 and 1963, Crédit Agricole medium and long-term 
loans rose from 630 million francs to 13 billion francs (INSEE, 1986). The Crédit Agricole 
considerably increased its services to farmers in comparison to the prewar period, in addition to 
offering low rates of interest and increasing the availability of credit, corresponding to farmers’ 
far greater political power.11 As shown with the logarithmic scale in figure one, the government 
likewise increased substantially the level of funds directed to the agricultural sector.
                                                                                                                                                            
Beckhart’s  Banking Systems (1954) and Dupont’s Les Contrôle des Banques et la Direction du 
Crédit en France (1952).
10 461 out of 494 representatives from mainland France voted for the law; 442 from the left and 
center, and 19 from the right; 33 on the right voted against.
11 Carré, Dubois, and Malinvaud, 1975, 337.
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Figure 1: Value of Advances from the State to the Crédit Agricole (1923-1972)
in million of Francs (logarithmic scale)
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Source: adapted from Gueslin, André. 1984. Histoire des Crédit Agricoles, p. 322.
7. Implications for China
Based on the evidence, what are the implications for China? To answer this question, it is useful 
to first describe some of the key features of China’s financial system and to then consider how 
actors could affect the government’s attempts to modernize it.
The Financial System: With regard to the key dimensions of the financial system that proxy for 
the structure of capitalism, China is banking-dominated, has a high level of government 
intervention with lending disproportionately directed to wholly or partially state-owned 
enterprises, and there is a substantial agricultural sector comprising 60% of the population. 
While developing countries often exhibit many of these features, China is unusual even within 
this group. As compared to the level of bank intermediation in other Asian countries (45 percent 
in Thailand, 43 percent in India, and 37 percent in the Philippines), banks intermediate nearly 75 
percent in China. And looking at the flow of funds data demonstrates that the banking sector’s 
role is even larger, providing 95 percent of corporate funding in recent years. Indeed, as a 
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McKinsey (2006) study notes, “The most striking institutional feature of China’s financial 
system is the dominance of its banking sector.” Figure 2 clearly illustrates this point.
Figure 2: China’s Banking-Dominated Financial System
(2004 Data)
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China’s economy is more heavily reliant on banks and relationships than any of the 15
countries examined in section five has been in the twentieth century. Placing China along the 
same scale used to order OECD countries, as in table seven, we see that China falls at the far end 
of the CME side of the spectrum. 
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Table 7: Stock Market Capitalization over Bank Deposits with China Included
High                                                                                                                            Low
(LME)                                                                                                                        (CME)
Pre-
WWII
JAP 
4.8
CAN 
4.23
UK 
3.09
FRA 
2.42
NET 
2.07
BEL 
1.98
USA 
1.73
AUS 
1.1
GER 
1.1
AUT 
1.02
ITA 
0.77
SWE 
0.64
SWI 
0.58
DEN 
0.43
NOR 
0.25
Post-
WWII
CAN 
2.89
UK 
2.77
USA 
1.97
JAP 
1.56
AUS 
1.4
SWI 
1.37
NET 
1.18
GER 
0.74
DEN 
0.7
NOR 
0.66
BEL 
0.61
FRA 
0.49
SWE 
0.42
ITA 
0.32
AUT 
0.2
CHINA
0.145
Data Source for China: McKinsey (2006).
The pre-WWII placement is particularly notable since other countries more closely 
resembled China’s level of economic development at that time. And we can see that all but one 
(Switzerland) of the countries falling at the CME end of the spectrum in the pre-WWII period 
have remained coordinated market economies to this day. This is important to note insofar as 
institutional inertia preserves a country’s initial institutional arrangements. 
Although state ownership of firms has declined over the past 10 years, the banking 
system remains firmly in government hands. Indeed, China has the highest level of state 
ownership of banks of any major economy in the world (McKinsey, 2006). This stands in stark 
contrast to the experience of Eastern Europe’s transitional economies and other emerging 
markets where privatization of the banking sector has occurred with great alacrity since 1990. As 
a result, the Chinese government exerts effective control over the funds lent through the banking 
system since sixty percent of bank assets are held by four state-owned commercial banks: Bank 
of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural 
Bank of China. Although the government has allowed foreign banks to purchase portions of 
several large banks in the past couple years, foreign ownership stakes remain small with the state 
still firmly in control. China also has around 120 city commercial banks and joint stock banks, as 
well as more than 30,000 rural and urban credit cooperatives, most of which are controlled or 
influenced by various levels of government.
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McKinsey offers ten recommendations to improve the financial system, many of which 
involve deregulating and liberalizing the banking system and capital markets. But there are likely 
to be considerable political obstacles to implementing these reforms. In particular, important 
actors in China’s political economy - such as farmers, labor, owners of large firms, and the 
politicians who depend on these actors’ acquiescence (if not their support) – are likely to have 
conflicting views over arms-length-oriented financial liberalization. What kind of capitalist 
outcome is likely based on the way China’s political system mediates pressure from these actors?
Farmers: These actors (complemented by owners of small firms) favor reforms to the financial 
system, but they want a better banking system, not necessarily a better and larger equity market. 
The diversion of capital to state-owned enterprises and the lack of appropriate credit rating 
procedures denies them of much needed capital. As long as Chinese politicians rely on local 
groups to remain politically powerful, farmers (and small firms) will continue to play an 
important role and push for policies that divert funds away from the cities and keep finance local 
(Lardy, 1998). And this is consistent with local leaders’ incentives. To be sure, money will go to 
urban areas more than before since the growth of new firms will attract financing, however, the 
level of financing to urban areas will not achieve its potential. To keep finance local, farmers 
(and local Chinese politicians who depend on their support/acquiescence) will attempt to block 
many of the efficiency enhancing reforms of the banking system, as witnessed in the U.S. with 
the McFadden and Glass-Steagall Acts. Because leaders in Beijing fear a potential farmers’ 
rebellion, they cannot press too hard for reforms. This fear is exacerbated by the fact that farmers 
lack legal property rights to their land, so they have a direct interest in a democratic government 
that would protect property rights. And as 60 percent of the population, they would certainly gain 
30
from electoral democracy. At the central party meeting in 2004, the leadership called rural unrest 
a “life or death” issue for the party.12
Labor: Although workers and farmers lack political representation in China’s government, they 
exercise unusual political influence because of Chinese leaders’ fears of popular upheaval. 
Consequently, Chinese officials placate these groups while at the same time slowly shifting the 
economy in a market-oriented direction, and integrating it into the global economy. Doing this 
necessarily means moving the economy away from agriculture towards industry, and allowing 
unsuccessful businesses to fail, and for their workers to lose their jobs. Because of the large 
numbers of noncompetitive state-owned enterprises, and the potentially huge job losses, Chinese 
leaders have good reasons to fear a political firestorm from such maneuvers. Local politics 
reinforces this political pressure: “branch managers sometimes face political pressure from local 
government leaders to continue to supply [state-owned enterprise] funding, because this keeps 
the largest employers in the area afloat, and it is in the interest of both the local government and 
the bank itself to protect local jobs” (McKinsey, 2006: 62). At present, China’s strategy seems to 
be to allow the economy to grow its way out of the problem, by creating enough jobs in 
competitive firms so that most workers do not oppose government efforts to wean companies off 
of state subsidized lending over time. But this strategy could be problematic since it crucially 
depends on maintaining high and stable levels of economic growth over a long period of time. 
For example, just to meet the growing demand for jobs (from graduates of college, vocational 
school, secondary school, ex-soldiers, rural-urban migrants, laid-off workers, and the urban 
                                                
12 “Democracy in China: Civil Rights: Protests surge as reforms fail to match rising hopes,” by 
Jonathan Watts, in Guardian International, October 11, 2005, page 17.
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unemployed), the Chinese economy must grow at least 7 percent annually, according to the 
former vice president of the CCP Party School Zheng Bijian (Shirk, 2007: 30). But Wu (2006) 
points to several potential stumbling blocks ahead for the continuance of China’s high levels of 
economic growth, including: economic overheating, widening regional and rural-urban economic 
divides, banking sector fragility, environmental degradation, rampant corruption, ageing 
population, and military conflict with Taiwan. The very possibility of an economic slowdown 
places great pressure on Chinese leaders to bear workers’ interests in mind when crafting policy.
Capital: While state-owned enterprises favor the continuance of directed lending via policy 
banks, competitive private-sector business would largely prefer liberalizing reforms that not only 
improve banking but also make equity markets easier to tap. Reducing the transactions costs of 
obtaining financing is certainly in their interest. But there are considerable obstacles to 
improving the banking system and securities markets, and moving the economy towards more 
reliance on arms-length transactions, including: (1) a high level of state ownership of Chinese 
banks which contributes to weak governance, lack of commercial mindset, and operational 
weaknesses within banks; (2) a highly decentralized banking and political structure that makes 
change difficult; and (3) a poorly functioning judicial system with weak legal protection for 
investors. Until these problems are addressed, LME-style institutions are unlikely to arise, and 
the non-performing loans problem and corruption will likely continue.
State ownership of banks makes it more difficult to reduce local political influence over 
lending decisions. It also reduces competition and lessens pressure on banks to operate on a 
commercial, profit-oriented basis. This is particularly true in China, where the government has 
injected $105 billion into the banking system since 1998 to recapitalize banks and has engineered 
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a transfer of $307 billion of nonperforming loans to asset-management companies. Although the 
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has publicly stated that banks should not 
count on future capital injections, past actions create a situation ripe with potential for moral 
hazard. (McKinsey, 2006: 36).
While the level of banks’ nonperforming loans has fallen from over 50% in 1998-9 to 
around 21-25% at then end of 2005, according to Standard & Poor’s, this is still considered 
unacceptably high by international standards. The CBRC has been charged with cleaning up 
NPLs by ensuring that banks meet BIS capital adequacy ratios, however, the underlying 
problems remain unresolved: poor corporate governance, ineffectual internal controls, and a 
weak credit-risk-management culture. A McKinsey report points out that many Chinese banks 
lack “even the most fundamental components of good corporate governance,” and they further 
single out “poor credit-risk-management skills” as a critical issue in CBRC’s ongoing efforts to 
overhaul Chinese banks, especially among the 120 or so smaller commercial banks and the 
30,000 urban and rural credit cooperatives which account for more than half of new lending 
(Bekier et al, 2005). These problems have not only contributed to bad lending practices –
resulting in non-performing loans – but they have also led to persistently high levels of fraud. 
For example, just in 2005, the CBRC uncovered ‘irregularities’ involving ‘misused funds’ 
amounting to RMB 767.1 billion (US$93.7 billion). But with only US$180 million, or 0.19%, of 
these funds being recovered, one can imagine the staggering damage inflicted on China’s 
banking system as a result of the year after year effects of these malpractices (Wu, 2006). On top 
of this, the efforts to clean up banks’ bad debts with asset-recovery companies have often 
foundered on the same cronyism and corruption that created the debt crisis. According to Yu 
Nanping, a banking expert at East China Normal University in Shanghai, “A lot of the 
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management people have been taken directly from the banks … they are disposing a lot of the 
bad loans they created before, and they are covering up a lot of corruption cases.”13
Recently, Chinese regulators have attempted to hasten and deepen the reform process by 
letting foreign banks acquire stakes of up to 25% ownership of their Chinese counterparts on a 
highly selective basis. It is hoped that foreign banks will bring in fresh capital, cutting-edge 
technologies, and managerial expertise to help modernize China’s antiquated banks. However, as 
minority shareholders, foreign banks’ influence at the board-of-directors level, and hence on the 
corporate governance issue, will likely be limited. Improvements in this area will require strong 
political will.
Because of China’s massive size and decentralized power structure, banking system 
reforms will be a long and difficult task. Among China’s national banks, a good deal of 
autonomy remains at the branch and regional levels. And the smaller banks and cooperatives, 
unlikely to attract foreign investment, will be especially slow to improve. This decentralized 
structure makes introducing more market-oriented lending decisions difficult, because lending 
decisions made at the local branch level are more susceptible to influence from local government 
officials. While the US was able to circumvent its fragmented financial structure via the 
development of securities markets, China faces greater obstacles here because of the problems 
that arise from the state’s preponderant control of banks, and its deficient judicial system.
Indeed, the biggest challenge to conquering corruption and protecting investors 
(particularly in an arms-length LME system) is the existence of a weak judiciary, especially at 
sub-national levels, which frequently fails to provide channels for victims of corruption to 
                                                
13 “China’s Unyielding Banking Crisis; Corruption and Cronyism Often Thwart Efforts to 
Eradicate Bad Debts,” by Peter S. Goodman, Washington Post, June 6, 2005, Section A01.
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address their grievances and seek redress. China’s scores on the World Bank’s “Rule of Law” 
index have slid in recent years;14 in 2004, China ranked 124th out of 208 countries. As most of 
China’s corrupt incidents occur at the country, township and village levels, they usually involve 
local officials who abuse their powers. And because these officials exercise almost absolute 
authority in their own domains, they also control the channels for addressing grievances. 
8. Conclusions
China’s economy can be characterized as heavily reliant on relationships. This is unlikely to 
change any time soon for two main reasons: (1) central government political authorities are 
fearful of inciting popular revolt - particularly among workers and farmers - so they continue to 
funnel lending to firms and individuals for politically expedient reasons; and (2) its decentralized 
political structure grants local leaders considerable power, including the power to decide who 
receives loans from the nation’s policy banks. The decentralized political structure creates 
several additional hurdles for liberalizing reforms by: (a) undermining nationwide efficiency-
enhancing reforms to the banking sector; (b) preserving corruption at the local level because of 
local leaders’ influence over lending decisions and the lack of legal protection for investors; and 
(c) preventing the emergence of an effective judicial system divorced from political interference. 
This will lead to mutual expectations about economic interactions which will become ingrained, 
and institutionalized (both formally and informally), over time. As witnessed among pre-WWII 
OECD countries, these early patterns are unlikely to change. 
                                                
14 China’s scores on the World Bank’s “Rule of Law” index slid from -0.22 in 1998 to -0.47 in 
2004. Scores for the World Bank’s “Governance Indicators” range from -2.5 to +2.5 with a mean 
of zero. Higher negative scores correspond to poorer governance.
35
But what if China experiences an economic downturn that leads to domestic unrest and a 
change of government? If democratic reforms occur, farmers will likely comprise the largest 
segment of the electorate (the agricultural population presently accounts for 60% of the total), 
and labor would form much of the rest. Under such circumstances, a coordinated market 
economy would likely emerge, perhaps shifting the system from its present statist model to a 
Mediterranean style of CME, or possibly to an inclusive CME like Japan, if capital successfully 
retains political influence (but the preservation of capital’s political influence in Japan and 
Germany was due to American intervention). 
Because China seems likely to retain extensive intervention in the economy, it is unlikely 
to evolve as the US financial system did. Indeed, Chinese leaders should not try to turn China 
into a US-style LME. They should instead build institutions that complement an economy 
centered around relationships, including specialized education and innovation systems that focus 
on improvements in existing technologies and focus on moving into high quality products that 
requires highly skilled labor as opposed to high volume, low cost production. At the same time, 
it needs to avoid some of the mistakes others have made. In particular, a persistently high level 
of government intervention, similar to France after WWII, could lead to problems for its firms 
down the road by creating poor intra-firm worker-manager relations, and lead to lower value-
added production (Ernst, 2003). China should likewise encourage institutional mechanisms that 
allow workers and managers to work together within the firm, as with codetermination in 
Germany. Finding ways to transition provincial rural economies away from farming to 
alternative kinds of small business will be difficult, but post-WWII Germany may be a useful 
guide here as well.
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